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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
__________ 
 
No. 15-1531 
__________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
 
v. 
 
WALTER ALSTON BROWN, JR., 
      Appellant 
 
__________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Crim. No. 2:13-cr-00176-004) 
District Judge: Hon. Berle M. Schiller 
__________ 
 
On Remand from the Supreme Court of the United States 
November 27, 2017 
 
(Originally Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) on July 14, 2016) 
 
BEFORE: FUENTES,* SHWARTZ, and BARRY, ** Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed:  March 5, 2018) 
__________ 
                                              
* The Honorable Julio M. Fuentes assumed senior status on July 18, 2016.   
** The Honorable Maryanne Trump Barry assumed inactive status after the prior Panel 
opinion was filed. Under Third Circuit I.O.P. 10.8.7 and 12.1, this opinion on remand is 
being filed by a quorum of the original Panel.   
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OPINION*** 
__________ 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge 
 
This case returns to us from the United States Supreme Court, which vacated part 
of our earlier judgment1 and remanded for reconsideration in light of Honeycutt v. United 
States, 137 S. Ct. 1626 (2017). Honeycutt held that that under 21 U.S.C. § 853, which 
mandates forfeiture of proceeds derived from certain drug crimes, a defendant may not be 
held “jointly and severally liable for property that his co-conspirator derived from the 
crime but that the defendant himself did not acquire.”2 Writing for the unanimous Court, 
Justice Sotomayor explained that the structure and language of § 853(a) “limit[s] 
forfeiture under § 853 to tainted property[,] that is, property flowing from . . . or used in 
. . . the crime itself,” and “defines forfeitable property solely in terms of personal 
possession or use.”3 As a result, only “tainted property acquired or used by the 
defendant” is subject to § 853(a) forfeiture, preventing the imposition of joint and several 
liability reaching untainted property as well.4  
                                              
*** This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and under Third Circuit I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
1 Walter Alston Brown, Jr.’s appeal was originally consolidated with that of co-
conspirator Cynthia Evette Brown, in C.A. No. 15-1505.  We vacated in part the 
judgment of the District Court as to Cynthia Brown in United States v. Brown, 694 F. 
App’x 57 (3d Cir. 2017).  
2 Honeycutt, 137 S. Ct. at 1630. 
3 Id. at 1632. 
4 Id. at 1633. 
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For the same reasons discussed in our decision on remand of his co-conspirator’s 
appeal,5 the reasoning of Honeycutt applies here to the case of Walter Brown, Jr. The 
District Court entered a “Forfeiture Money Judgment” against Brown in the amount of 
$7,213,123, for which he was deemed “jointly and severally liable.”6 At least one of the 
statutes under which forfeiture was ordered, 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(2) (“Criminal 
forfeiture”), shares several features with 21 U.S.C. § 853, such as a reach limited to 
property “constituting” or “derived from” proceeds obtained “directly or indirectly” from 
the crime.7 Thus, like § 853, § 982(a)(2) applies to tainted property only.8 The statute’s 
use of “obtained,” meanwhile, suggests that the scope of forfeiture is “define[d] . . . 
solely in terms of personal possession or use,” and the adverbs “directly” and “indirectly” 
do not “negate th[at] requirement.”9 Accordingly, we conclude that Honeycutt applies 
with equal force to § 982(a), and that the imposition of joint and several liability in the 
forfeiture money judgment was an error which requires remand to correct.    
For the above reasons, and in light of Honeycutt, we will vacate the District 
Court’s judgment of sentence in part and remand for resentencing for the sole purpose of 
determining the appropriate forfeiture amount. The District Court’s judgment is 
otherwise affirmed for the reasons set forth in our original opinion.  
                                              
5 See United States v. Brown, 694 F. App’x 57 (3d Cir. 2017). 
6 JA 6a–7a. 
7 Compare 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(1), with 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(2). 
8 See Honeycutt, 137 S. Ct. at 1632. 
9 Id. at 1632–33.  
